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NON-CRIMINAL HABEAS CORPUS FOR QUARANTINE AND
ISOLATION DETAINEES: SERVING THE PRIVATE RIGHT
OR VIOLATING PUBLIC POLICY?
Christopher Ogolla, LL.M, J.D., MA., MP.H*
INTRODUCTION
The writ of habeas corpus has been called the "Great Writ" since it is
the most fundamental device we have to protect ourselves from arbitrary
arrest or continued confinement without just cause.' Protection for the
privilege of habeas corpus was one of the few safeguards of liberty
specified in a constitution that, at the outset, had no Bill of Rights.2 The
Framers viewed freedom from unlawful restraint as a fundamental precept
of liberty, and they understood the writ of habeas corpus as a vital
instrument to secure that freedom.' Experience taught, however, that the
common-law writ all too often had been insufficient to guard against the
abuse of monarchial power.4 This abuse of power is particularly worrying
in cases of non-criminal detention, for example, quarantine and isolation
where there has been little or no previous judicial review of the cause for
detention.
In public health emergencies, such as pandemics, the writ of habeas
corpus may serve as a limited means for relief.s However, a survey of the
circumstances under which persons detained for the control of infectious
*Academic Support Instructor, Thurgood Marshall School of Law, Texas Southern University, Houston
Texas. The author is a former Association of Schools of Public Health (ASPH) fellow at the Centers for
Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta GA. He would like to thank Professor Eric J. Miller, St. Louis
University School of Law for his review and comments regarding this paper as a work in progress
presentation at the March 2011 joint meeting of the Southeast/Southwest/Midwest People of Color Legal
Scholarship conference. Special thanks to Professor Chukwumerije Okezie, Thurgood Marshall School of
Law, for his insightful comments.
1. Edward P. Richards, Safeguarding Both Public Health and Safety and Personal Liberty Through the
"Great and Celebrated" Writ of Habeas Corpus ad Subjiciendum, LSU Law Center's Medical and Public
Health Law Site, http://biotech.law.Isu.edu/manual/adlaw/habeas-corpus.htm (last visited Sept. 1, 2011).
2. Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 739 (2008).
3. Id.
4. Id. at 740.
5. See Florida Court Education Council, Pandemic Influenza Bench Guide: Legal Issues Concerning
Quarantine and Isolation, 2007 ed., 42, at
http://www.flcourts.org/genpublic/courted/bin/pandemic-benchguide.pdf (noting that "the limitation of
this remedy is that it would only be available if an order restricted the liberty interests of an individual; if an
order affected a corporation, or an individual's property, livelihood, familial or religious interest, or other
protected interest, habeas would not lie.").
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diseases have been granted habeas corpus indicates that the overwhelming
majority of such habeas writs are denied, citing either broad police powers
or deference to the determinations of health officers. Courts denying the
relief tend to conclude that the isolation or quarantine of individuals during
a public health emergency serves the public good and that the termination
of individuals who are isolated or quarantined violates public policy.' On
the other hand, use of quarantine or isolation powers may create sensitive
issues related to civil liberties', for example, impinging on freedom of
movement, right of free association, freedom of religion, and restricting
freedom of assembly.
Additionally, it is reasonable to worry about the improper use of
quarantine because a significant number of health departments are led by
political appointees with little expertise in public health disease control.' In
some states, there are few or no board-certified public health physicians in
any positions of authority.'o Even more telling, most local and some state
health departments may not have staff counsels to advise the heads of
departments and employees on the legal ramifications of quarantine and
isolation. Moreover, because quarantine is not criminal detention, there is
no requirement to provide counsel to quarantined persons. We must
therefore be particularly cognizant of how due process limits are applied in
quarantine." For example, it may be easier to limit the due process rights
of a disfavored class, such as minorities or the poor, because of stereotypes
about susceptibility to communicable diseases. 2 The U.S. Supreme Court
has held that the individual's interest in the outcome of a civil commitment
proceeding is of such weight and gravity that due process requires the state
to justify confinement by proof more substantial than a mere
preponderance of the evidence. 3 Despite these dangers to civil liberties,
6. Kathleen S. Swendiman & Nancy Lee Jones, Congressional Research Service, The 2009 Influenza
Pandemic: Selected Legal Issues, Oct. 9, 2009, 41, at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R40560.pdf (noting
that " it would seem possible for a court to conclude that the isolation or quarantine of individuals during a
pandemic serves the public good and that the termination of individuals who are isolated or quarantined
violates public policy).
7. State Quarantine and Isolation Statutes, NAT'L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES,
http://www.ncsl.org/?Tabld=17104 (last visited on Sept. 1, 2011).
8. Richard P. McNelis, Problematic Application of Florida Administrative Law to Police Power Public
Health Actions. 68 LA. L. REv. 1145, 1157 (2008).
9. Edward P. Richards, Building Public Health Emergency Legal Preparedness: Quarantine Laws and
Public Health Realities, 33 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 69, 70 (2005).
10. Id.
11. Scott Burris, Building Public Health Emergency Legal Preparedness: Quarantine Laws and Public
Health Realities, 33 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 69, 71 (2005).
12. Id.
13. Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 427 (1979).
136
NON-CRIMNAL HABEAS CORPUS
majority of courts routinely uphold quarantine orders and deny habeas
writs.
A few courts on the other hand, have granted the writ, while refusing
to uphold the quarantine of an individual in cases where the state is unable
to meet its burden of proof concerning that individual's potential danger to
others, or if the court views the restriction as unreasonable and or
oppressive.' 4 Other legal issues, for example, medical costs for an
involuntarily confined individual and even discrimination of those who are
quarantined,'" may arise if quarantine, isolation, and other public health
measures were used to deal with a widespread public health emergency
such as a biological terror attack or an influenza pandemic."
Consequently, there is a tension between the writ's role in serving the
private right, on the one hand, and on the other, its potential to negatively
impact public safety and health." This is what drives the central thesis of
this paper.
This paper begins by defining quarantine and isolation and gives a
brief history of non-criminal habeas corpus as it relates to quarantine and
isolation detainees. Part two discusses a brief history of habeas corpus in
non-criminal detention observing that despite the long association between
habeas corpus and criminal confinement, the writ was available at
common law to challenge a broad range of non-criminal confinement, both
public and private.'" Part three talks about the effects of quarantine and
isolation on private citizens arguing that both severely curtail the freedom
of the individuals to whom they are applied.19 Parts four and five discuss
federal and state laws regarding quarantine with specific reference to
procedures for filing a petition for writ of habeas corpus for quarantine or
isolation detainees. The paper notes that state quarantine laws are archaic,
inconsistent, inadequate,2 0 unclear as to whether they apply in the civil
14. Kathleen S. Swendiman & Jennifer K. Elsea, Federal and State Quarantine and Isolation Authority,
CRS REPORT FOR CONGRESS, http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/RL33201.pdf.
15. Id. at 15.
16. Id.
17. See Richards, supra note 1, (discussing the habeas rulings in People ex rel. Jennie Barmore v.
Robertson, 302 Ill. 422 (1922) and Illinois v. Adams, 149 Ill. 2d 331 (1992) and noting that "the principles
of public health law did not change between 1922 and 1992 - the testing laws were upheld both times....
Something, however, did change - the 'provider corporate culture' of many in the public health field shifted
from 'disease prevention' to what might be best described as a 'misplaced zeal for civil rights.")
18. Jonathan Hafetz, The Untold Story of Non Criminal Habeas Corpus and the 1996 Immigration Acts,
107 YALE L.J. 2509, 2522 (1998).
19. Michelle Daubert, Pandemic Fears and Contemporary Quarantine: Protecting Liberty Through a
Continuum of Due Process Rights, 54 BUFF. L. REv. 1299 (2007).
20. See Annas, supra note 20, at 46 (noting that "properly worried that many state public health laws are
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context of an isolation or quarantine order,2 1 and maybe constitutionally
troubling.2 2 The paper calls for states to update these laws to conform to
modem day disease treatment procedures and where applicable, use the
least restrictive means possible for quarantine and isolation.23 In parts six
and seven, the paper analyzes cases where the writ was denied, as well as
cases granting the writ. It notes that the historic cases indicate that there is
little review of process through habeas corpus. This is because in a
majority of the cases, courts tended to defer to the decisions made by
health officers.
In parts seven and eight, the paper discusses the due process
requirements in quarantine and isolation, with specific focus on the need
for habeas corpus relief for quarantine and isolation detainees. In these
sections, the paper argues that although individuals' constitutionally
protected interests maybe trumped by public health emergencies, the
decisions of the health authorities, in such situations, should not be
arbitrary and capricious. To this end, certain guidelines should be
followed. The paper addresses these guidelines in part nine, by asserting
that quarantine and isolation guidelines should be consistent with some
due process requirements, that is, "requiring an assessment of, inter alia,
the risk of an erroneous deprivation of a liberty interest and the probable
value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards."24 These
procedural safe guards should include among others, written notice,
availability of legal counsel, and judicial review within reasonable time.
More importantly, the paper suggests that all quarantine and isolation
orders should contain the constitutional requirements of habeas corpus as a
direct challenge to detention.
The paper concludes by stressing that where public health and safety
is concerned, quarantine and isolation can be useful tools. But where the
outdated and perhaps inadequate to permit state officials from effectively containing an epidemic caused by
a bioterrorist attack, in the wake of 9/11 the CDC advised all states to review the adequacies of their laws
with special attention to quarantining people in the event of a smallpox attack.").
21. See generally Writs of Habeas Corpus and Personal Restraint Petitions, Public Health Emergency
Bench Book, WASHINGTON COURTS,
http://www.courts.wa.gov/manuals/?fa=manuals.showManualsPage&manualid-publicHealth&file-public
Health-07 (last visited Sept. 1, 2011) ("When a writ of habeas corpus is filed in Superior Court, it should
probably be considered by the trial court and not transferred to an appellate court."). Dicta by the Supreme
Court in a criminal case allows a habeas petition to be transferred to the appellate courts as a personal
restraint petition. See Toliver v. Olsen, 746 P.2d 809 (1987) (It is unclear whether this rule applies in the
civil context of an isolation or quarantine order).
22. Lawrence Gostin, Constitutional Review of Civil Commitment, in PUBLIC HEALTH LAW: POWER, DUTY
AND RESTRAINT, 214 (2000).
23. NAT'L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, supra note 7.
24. Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 781.
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decisions of the health officers might be arbitrary and capricious, the writ
of habeas corpus may serve as a limited means for relief without violating
public policy.
I. ISOLATION AND QUARANTINE
Isolation is used to separate ill persons who have a communicable
disease from those who are healthy. Isolation restricts the movement of ill
persons to help stop the spread of certain diseases.25 Quarantine, on the
other hand, is used to separate and restrict the movement of well persons
who may have been exposed to a communicable disease to see if they
become ill.26 These people may have been exposed to a disease and do not
know it, or they may have the disease but do not show symptoms.
Quarantine can also help limit the spread of communicable disease.27 By
Executive Order of the President,28 federal isolation and quarantine are
authorized for the following diseases: cholera, diphtheria, infectious
tuberculosis, plague, smallpox, yellow fever, viral hemorrhagic fevers,
Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS), and flu that can cause a
pandemic.29 Some of these diseases have afflicted the nation since its
founding, for example, flu and yellow fever,30 whereas others like, SARS,
have recently emerged.' In the early days of the nation, quarantine was a
common tool of disease control.32 Broad powers to lock up people for the
simple reason that they may be sick and potentially contagious have
coexisted comfortably with the criminal justice system for hundreds of




28. See EXECUTIVE ORDER 13295, RevisedList of Quarantinable Communicable Diseases (April 4, 2003);
see also EXECUTIVE ORDER 13375 (April 1, 2005) (amending the Executive Order of April 1, 2003 by
adding "influenza caused by novel or re-emergent influenza viruses that are causing, or have the potential
to cause, a pandemic" to the list of quarantinable communicable diseases).
29. CTRS. DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION, supra note 25.
30. Yellow fever epidemics struck the United States repeatedly in the 18th and 19th centuries. See Paterson
KD, Yellow Fever Epidemics and Mortality in the United States, 1693-1905, 34 Soc. SC. MED. 855-65
(1992).
31. Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) is a viral respiratory illness caused by a coronavirus,
called SARS-associated coronavins (SARS-CoV). SARS was first reported in Asia in February 2003.
According to the World Health Organization (WHO), a total of 8,098 people worldwide became sick with
SARS during the 2003 outbreak. Of these, 774 died. See CDC Fact Sheet, Basic Information About SARS,
CTRS. DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION, http://www.cdc.gov/ncidod/sars/factsheet.htm (last visited
Sept 1, 2011).
32. See, e.g., The Quarantine Question. Meeting ofthe Citizens ofRichmond County, N.Y. TIMES, Sept 21,
1858 (reporting on the burning of the Quarantine Hospital in Richmond County, NY).
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years. In such situations, habeas corpus "provided for meaningful and
independent judicial inquiry regarding the factual basis for detention,
including consideration of additional evidence." 34 It is therefore essential
to understand the role of habeas corpus in non-criminal detention from an
historical perspective.
II. HISTORY OF HABEAS CORPUS IN NON-CRIMINAL
DETENTION
Habeas corpus is an ancient remedy whose original purpose was to
contest detention by the king.35 Historically, such challenges represented
the "core" circumstances in which the habeas right has operated.36 English
courts provided common law protections to petitioners by compelling the
executive to turn over factual information and then test the government's
allegations against facts developed by the petitioner." The heart of these
common law protections was eventually codified in the Habeas Corpus
Act of 1816, which extended statutory protection to habeas applicants who
were being held in non-criminal detention." The American colonists
brought with them to this country the remedy by habeas corpus as it
existed in England as part of the common law.39 From the seventeenth
century on, the English battles over the meaning of habeas and the depth
and breadth of its procedures were followed in the American colonies.40
By the time of the framing of the Constitution, the writ was enshrined in
the Suspension Clause.41
Article I, Section 9 of the U.S. Constitution provides in pertinent part
that the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall not be suspended,
unless when in cases of rebellion or invasion the public safety may require
it.42 Federal courts have been authorized to issue writs of habeas corpus
since the enactment of the Judiciary Act of 1789.43 Section 2241 of the
33. Adam Klein & Benjamin Wittes, Preventive Detention in American Theory and Practice, 2 HARV.
NAT'L SEC. J. 85, 170 (2011).
34. See James Oldham et al., Brief of Legal Historians as Amici Curie in Support of Petitioners,
Boumediene v. Bush, http://www.wilmerhale.com/files/upload/Boumediene LegalHistoriansamicus.pdf.
35. Jonathan Shaw, The War and the Writ. Habeas Corpus and Security in an Age of Terrorism, HARV.
MAGAZINE, Jan. 2009, at 24-25.
36. Marc D. Falkoff, Back to Basics: Habeas Corpus Procedures and Long-term Executive Detention, 86
DENv. U.L. REv. 961, 964 (2009).
37. Id. at 977.
38. Id.
39. 39 C.J.S. Habeas Corpus § 3 (June 2011).
40. Falkoff, supra note 36, at 977.
41. Id.
42. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 9.
43. INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 305 (2001).
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Judicial Code provides that federal judges may grant the writ of habeas
corpus on the application of a prisoner held "in custody in violation of the
Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States."" Thus, the writ has
long been associated with criminal confinement.4 5
Despite the long association between habeas corpus and criminal
confinement, the writ was available at common law to challenge a broad
range of non-criminal confinement, both public and private.46 At its
historical core, the writ of habeas corpus has served as a means of
reviewing the legality of executive detention. 47 Here in the U.S., during the
formative years of our government, the writ of habeas corpus was
available to non-enemy aliens as well as to citizens."8 The writ enabled
them to challenge executive and private detention in civil cases as well as
criminal ones.49
The issuance of the writ was not limited to challenges to the
jurisdiction of the custodian, but encompassed detentions based on errors
of law, including the erroneous application or interpretation of statutes.o
The common-law habeas court's role was most extensive in cases of
pretrial and non-criminal detention, where there had been little or no
previous judicial review of the cause for detention." Thus, it was used to
command the discharge of seamen who had a statutory exemption from
impressment into the British Navy, to emancipate slaves, and to obtain the
freedom of apprentices and asylum inmates.52
In terms of public health, non-criminal habeas corpus has been used
as a limited means for relief from quarantine detention. Once a person has
44. Id.
45. The federal system requires that a state prisoner exhaust the available state remedies before a federal
court may issue a writ of habeas corpus. O'Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838 (1999). According to 28
U.S.C. § 2241(c) (2006), the writ of habeas corpus shall not extend to a prisoner unless: (1) He is in
custody under or by color of the authority of the United States or is committed for trial before some court
thereof; or (2) He is in custody for an act done or omitted in pursuance of an Act of Congress, or an order,
process, judgment or decree of a court or judge of the United States; or (3) He is in custody in violation of
the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States; or (4) He, being a citizen of a foreign state and
domiciled therein is in custody for an act done or omitted under any alleged right, title, authority, privilege,
protection, or exemption claimed under the commission, order or sanction of any foreign state, or under
color thereof, the validity and effect of which depend upon the law of nations; or (5) It is necessary to bring
him into court to testify or for trial.
46. Hafetz, supra note 18, at 2522.
47. INS, 533 U.S. at 301.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 302.
50. Id.
51. Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 780.
52. INS, 533 U.S. at 302.
1412011]
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been isolated or quarantined, the Constitution guarantees due process
through a habeas process proceeding.5 3 Historically, the writ has been
used as the appropriate remedy to question the legality of the detention of
one held under quarantine or health regulations as suspected of infection
with a contagious or infectious disease, one known to be infected with
such a disease or having been exposed to the contagion, or as an excessive
user of narcotics and drugs.54 Recently, it has been used to challenge
confinement on grounds of refusal to undergo HIV AIDS testing,"
tuberculosis infection,56 and "civil commitment of persons, who, due to a
mental abnormality, or a personality disorder, are likely to engage in
predatory acts of sexual violence.""
III. EFFECTS OF QUARANTINE AND ISOLATION ON PRIVATE
CITIZENS
Quarantine and isolation severely curtail the freedom of the
individuals to whom they are applied." The most obvious ones are
impinging on the individual's "freedom of movement, right of free
association, possibly freedom of religion and almost surely restricting
freedom of assembly."59 Although the Constitution does not specifically
grant a right to travel, the Supreme Court has held that there is
fundamental right to travel.o However, quarantine and isolation almost
always impose individual restrictions on travel. Additionally, individuals
who are isolated and or quarantined are likely to face stigma. In May 2009
for example, fearing an outbreak of swine flu from a Mexican airline
passenger, "Chinese authorities began confining dozens of seemingly
healthy Mexicans to hotels and hospitals, even escorting some from their
hotels in the middle of the night for testing"6' The Mexicans felt they had
53. Edward P. Richards & Katharine Rathbum, Public Health Law, in PUBLIC HEALTH PREVENTIVE
MEDICINE, 1264 (Robert Wallace et al., 15" ed., 2008).
54. Quarantine and Health, 29 C.J. § 91 (1922).
55. Illinois v. Adams, 149 Ill. 2d 331 (1992).
56. See Judge's Memorandum, Livingston v. Maryland Division of Corrections et al., Civil Action NO:
WDQ-09-682 (D. Md. Sept. 18, 2009), at http://docs.justia.com/cases/federal/district-
courts/maryland/mddce/1:2009cv00682/166639/18/0.pdf (Plaintiff, who was diagnosed with Multi-drug
resistant TB walked away from the hospital against medical advice. Plaintiff was then charged with
behaving in a disorderly manner, leaving quarantine placement and failing to comply with the quarantine
order.).
57. Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 350 (1997).
58. Daubert, supra note 19.
59. MeNelis, supra note 8, at 1157.
60. Swendiman & Jones, supra note 6 at 30 (citing United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745 (1966); Shapiro v.
Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969)).
61. Marc Lacey & Andrew Jacobs, Even as Fears of Flu Ebb, Mexicans Feel Stigma, N.Y. TIMES, May 5,
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62been typecast as disease carriers and subjected to humiliating treatment.
It is worth noting here that in addition to stigma, individuals who are
isolated are sometimes viewed, rightly or wrongly, as dangerous patients.63
As Professor Wendy Parmet notes, the dangerous patient "perspective is
marked by several interrelated characteristics. Most notable is the
individualization of disease, the belief that a disease is caused by a single,
so-called dangerous patient. Thus, the perspective views an individual,
rather than a pathogen or broader social determinants, as the source of
danger. As a result, an infected individual becomes seen not a disease's
victim, but as its vector."'
Besides causing stigma, quarantine and isolation may affect an
individual's economic status as well. For example, according to a survey
conducted for the Trust for America's Health in 2007, ". . . among the 10
percent who say they would not adhere to the government's request of a
voluntary quarantine, most indicate that they could not stay at home due to
fears of losing needed income (64 percent) or losing their jobs altogether
(39 percent)."" In many cases, as the movement of people and goods are
restricted, businesses cannot freely sell their products and services, nor can
they compete fairly with those who are not fettered by the exercise of
control measures.66 This may result in closure of community institutions
such as churches, grocery stores and schools.67
Because use of quarantine or isolation powers may have significant
impacts on individuals' liberties, isolation or quarantine must be carried
out in the least restrictive setting necessary to maintain public health.68
Federal and state laws for quarantine and isolation should therefore take
the aforementioned issues (i.e. restriction of various freedoms) into
consideration. It is these federal and state quarantine laws that this
2009, at Al.
62. Id.
63. See generally Lawrence Gostin, Constitutional Review of Civil Commitment, in PUBLIC HEALTH LAW:
POWER DUTY AND RESTRAINT, 211 (2000) (noting that "[t]wo different kinds of isolation statutes exist:
those that authorize confinement of infected persons on the basis of disease status alone ('status-based
isolation') and those that authorize confinement of infected persons who engage in dangerous behavior
('behavior-based isolation').).
64. Wendy Parmet, Dangerous Perspectives: The Perils of Individualizing Public Health Problems, 30 J.
LEGAL MED. 83, 88 (2009).
65. NAT'L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, supra note 7.
66. Lawrence Gostin, When Terrorism Threatens Health: How Far Are Limitations on Personal and
Economic Liberties Justified?, 55 FLA. L. REv. 1105, 1107 (2003).
67. See, e.g., Swendiman & Jones, supra note 6, at 16 (noting that "since children tend to be more
susceptible than adults to infection and are responsible for more secondary transmission, studies have
suggested that community-wide school closures may help mitigate the impact of an influenza pandemic).
68. See Daubert, supra note 19, at 1353; NAT'L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, supra note 65.
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discussion now turns to.
IV. FEDERAL AND STATE QUARANTINE LAWS
The federal government has quarantine power over persons arriving
from foreign countries into the United States or traveling from one state or
possession into another." In addition, the federal government may assist
with or take over the management of an intrastate incident if requested by
state or if the federal government determines local efforts are inadequate."o
In 1796, Congress enacted the first federal quarantine law in response
to a yellow fever epidemic." This was repealed in 1799 and replaced with
an Act Respecting Quarantine and Health Laws.72 Several years and
changes later, Congress passed the Public Health Service Act in 1944."
Through this Act, the federal government took the lead in regard to
quarantine activities whose purposes were controlling the spread of
communicable diseases at the international and interstate levels.74
The Public Health Service Act outlines the federal government's
quarantine and isolation power. Under section 361 of the Public Health
Service (PHS) Act, 42 U.S.C. § 264, the Surgeon General, with the
approval of the Secretary of Health and Human Services (HHS) is
authorized to make and enforce regulations necessary "to prevent the
introduction, transmission, or spread of communicable diseases from
foreign countries into the States or possessions, or from one State or
possession into any other State or possession."" This section further
provides that "[r]egulations prescribed under this section shall not provide
for the apprehension, detention, or conditional release of individuals
except for the purpose of preventing the introduction, transmission, or
spread of such communicable diseases as may be specified from time to
time in Executive orders of the President upon the recommendation of the
Secretary, in consultation with the Surgeon General."n
Although the federal government plays a role in domestic quarantine
69. Eric Hargan, Building Public Health Emergency Legal Preparedness: Quarantine Laws and Public
Health Realities, 33 J. L. MED & ETHICS 69 (2005).
70. Swendiman & Elsea, supra note 14.
71. Joseph P. Topinka, Yaw, Pitch and Roll: Quarantine and Isolation at United States Airports, 30 J.L.
MED 51, 58 (2009).
72. Id.
73. Id. at 60.
74. Id.
75. Rebecca Chen, Closing The Gaps in the U.S. and International Quarantine Systems: Legal
Implications ofthe 2007 Tuberculosis Scare, 31 Hous. J. INT'L L. 83, 94 (2008).
76. 42 U.S.C. § 264(a) (2011).
77. 42 U.S.C. § 264(b) (2011).
144
NON-CRIMNAL HABEAS CORPUS
and isolation, the preservation of public health has historically been the
responsibility of the state and local governments." The public health
authority of the states derives from the police powers reserved to them by
the Tenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.7 9 Although every state has
the authority to pass and enforce quarantine laws as an exercise of their
police powers, these laws vary widely by state.80
In Alabama, for instance, an officer or guardcarrying out quarantine
may arrest without warrant anyone who attempts to violate quarantine
regulations and move them to the designated detention area or in front of
an officer with jurisdiction over the offense."' The arrest without a warrant
may likely raise Fourth Amendment questions.82 In Alaska, isolation and
quarantine shall be by the least restrictive means necessary to prevent the
spread of a contagious or possibly contagious disease that poses a
significant risk to public health and that isolation and quarantine may
include confinement to private homes or other private and public premises;
absent exceptional circumstances that would jeopardize public health, a
person shall be allowed to choose confinement in the person's home.83
Minnesota also allows isolation and quarantine in private homes or other
private or public premises.84
Mississippi quarantine law stands as an outlier providing that "for the
purpose of enforcing such orders of the State Health Officer, persons
employed by the department as investigators shall have general arrest
powers. All law enforcement officers are authorized and directed to assist
in the enforcement of such orders of the state health officer."85
Granting arrest powers to public health workers can be problematic
on several fronts. First, law enforcement and public health workers have
different roles." State health department investigators are not peace
78. Swendiman & Elsea, supra note 14.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 8.
81. ALA. CODE § 22-12-26 (2011).
82. In Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967), a department of health inspector entered a home,
without a warrant, to make routine annual inspections for possible violations of the city's housing code.
The homeowner refused to permit warrantless inspection of his premises. In finding for the homeowner,
the Supreme Court noted that "we cannot agree that the Fourth Amendment interests at stake in these
inspection cases are merely 'peripheral."' It is surely anomalous to say that the individual and his private
property are fully protected by the Fourth Amendment only when the individual is suspected of criminal
behavior." Camara, 387 U.S. at 523.
83. ALASKA STAT. § 18.15.385 (a) (b) (1) (2011).
84. MINN. STAT. §§ 144.419 (4) (b) (2011).
85. Miss. CODE ANN. § 41-23-5 (2011).
86. Cf Edward P. Richards, Collaboration Between Public Health and Law Enforcement: The
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officers nor should they be. Second, public health workers do not have the
training and experience to properly exert police power. Third, keeping
public health and police roles separate is also important because public
health searches depend on cooperation." Finally, in some communities,
having public health investigators identified with the police could
endanger their lives." This is not to say, however, that public health
officials cannot conduct inspections if it involves compliance with public
health laws and regulations.89 Sometimes, this may be coterminous with
law enforcement activities, especially for public safety reasons."o
Nevertheless this paper asserts that the power to arrest and detain should
still be within the province of law enforcement, because health
investigations should not be used as a proxy for criminal investigations.
In summary, state quarantine and isolation laws show great variance
from state to state, with some providing for minimum due process
requirements, whereas others greatly expand the powers of health officers.
Authority and enforcement mechanisms also differ. Besides the variation
in these laws, the procedures for filing petitions for writ of habeas corpus
for quarantine or isolation detainees are also not well enumerated in the
states.
V. PROCEDURES FOR FILING FOR HABEAS PETITIONS FOR
NON-CRIMINAL DETAINEES
Persons detained by the state may file a habeas corpus petition and
demand that a court review their detention." What is unclear, however, is
whether the procedures for filing for habeas corpus petitions for non-
Constitutional Challenge, 8 EMERG. INFECT Dis. 1157, 1158 (2002) (noting that "[b]ioterrorism
investigations require close cooperation between public health and law enforcement, which entails some
blurring of their usual roles," but cautions that "[p]ublic health officials cannot use their powers to
circumvent the criminal law protections provided by the Constitution" and "[i]nformation gained from
public health investigations that do not meet criminal due process standards cannot be used in criminal
prosecutions, and if such information is relied on by the police, it may contaminate their subsequent
investigations and render all their evidence inadmissible.").
87. Edward P. Richards, Dangerous People, Unsafe Conditions: The Constitutional Basis for Public
Health Surveillance, 30 J. LEGAL MED. 27, 43 (2009).
88. Id.
89. DEMETRIUS J. PORCHE, PUBLIC AND COMMUNITY HEALTH NURSING PRACTICE: A POPULATION-
BASED APPROACH, 367 (Sage Publications 2004).
90. See Richards, supra note 86 (noting that "[c]ertain public health functions, such as sexually transmitted
diseases (STD) control, have always involved cooperation with the police."); Victoria Sutton, Dual
Purpose Bioterrorism Investigations in Law Enforcement and Public Health Protection: How to Make
Them Work Consistent With the Rule of Law, 6 Hous. J. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 151 (2005) (noting that "the
dual efforts of law enforcement and public health personnel are important to the governmental purpose of
protecting citizen health and safety").
91. Edward P. Richards & Katharine C. Rathbun, Making State Public Health Laws Work for SARS
Outbreaks, 10 EMERG. INFECT DIs. J. 356 (2004).
NON-CRIMINAL HABEAS CORPUS
criminal detainees, such as quarantine and isolation detainees, are the
same, slightly or substantially different from those of criminal detainees.
In the State of Washington, for example, petitions for a writ of habeas
corpus are governed by chapter 7.36 RCW (Washington Revised Code).92
However, the Washington Administrative Code, WAC 246-100-055 also
establishes procedures for relief from isolation and quarantine in some
circumstances.93
Under RCW 7.36, the writs can be filed in the Supreme Court, the
Court of Appeals, or Superior Court.94 Application for the writ shall be
made by petition, signed and verified either by the plaintiff or by some
person in his behalf, and shall specify by whom the petitioner is restrained
of his liberty, the place where, the cause or pretense of the restraint
according to the best of the knowledge and belief of the applicant and if
the restraint be alleged to be illegal, in what the illegality consists.95Few, if
any, state statutes dealing with quarantine and isolation directly provide
for habeas corpus relief. States that do mention habeas corpus in reference
to old case law mostly deal with sexually transmitted diseases. The
following examples illustrate this point.
In California every person unlawfully imprisoned or restrained of his
liberty, under any pretense whatever, may prosecute a writ of habeas
corpus, to inquire into the cause of such imprisonment or restraint.96
Although it states "every person unlawfully imprisoned or restrained" this
provision falls under the California Penal Code suggesting that it is for
criminal detainees.97
For public health detainees, the California Health and Safety Code
provides that a mere suspicion unsupported by facts giving rise to
reasonable or probable cause affords no justification for depriving persons
of their liberty and subjecting them to virtual imprisonment under a
purported order of quarantine.98 Additionally, where the health authorities
92. REV. CODE WASH. § 7.36 (2011).
93. See WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 246-100-055 (2011) ("Any person or group of persons detained by order
of a local health officer pursuant to WAC 246-100-040(3) may apply to the court for an order to show
cause why the individual or group should not be released; (a) the court shall rule on the application to show
cause within forty-eight hours of its filing; (b) if the court grants the application, the court shall schedule a
hearing on the order to show cause as soon as practicable; and that (c) the issuance of an order to show
cause shall not stay or enjoin an isolation or quarantine order.").
94. REv. CODE WASH. § 7.36.040 (2011).
95. REv. CODE WASH. § 7.36.030 (2011).
96. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1473(a) (2011).
97. See id. This section is titled Part 2 of Criminal Procedure, Title 12 of Special Proceedings of a Criminal
Nature, and Chapter 1 of the Writ of Habeas Corpus.
98. CAL. HEALTH & SAF. CODE § 120145 (2011) citing In re Application of King, 16 P.2d 694 (Cal. App.
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rely upon the claim that a person quarantined is a prostitute and hence
likely to be afflicted with venereal disease, the burden of proof is upon
such authorities to establish the fact that the person is of that class and
character, and in the absence of such proof, she is entitled to her discharge
on habeas corpus." This language comes from a 1921 case where the
petitioner was arrested, charged with prostitution, paid bail but the chief of
police refused to release her because she refused to submit to a medical
examination to determine whether she was infected with a communicable,
infectious or quarantinable disease."o The Health and Safety Code does
not explain specific procedures for filing for habeas writs for those with
quarantinable diseases. It is however assumed that "habeas corpus is part
of the overall California statutory framework and is universally available
for the express purpose of challenging an allegedly unlawful restraint.""0 '
In Florida, a person may be detained if he or she is infected with a
sexually transmitted disease; engages in behaviors which create an
immediate and substantial threat to the public; evidences an intentional
disregard for the health of the public and refuses to conduct himself or
herself in such a manner as to not place others at risk and the person,
among others, will continue to expose the public to the risk of a sexually
transmissible disease until his or her hearing date. 102 A person detained
under this section may apply for a writ of habeas corpus attacking the
detention.'03
In North Dakota, an appeal from an order of the judge of a district
court authorizing a specified medical facility to receive a person for care,
treatment, quarantine and isolation may be taken to the. Supreme Court.'"
All persons placed in the custody of the state health officer for care,
treatment, quarantine and isolation are entitled to the benefit of the writ of
habeas corpus, and a determination as to whether the person has TB has to
be made at the hearing. 1o5
Finally, in Texas, the Health and Safety Code only provides that the
1932).
99. Id. citing In re Application of Arata, 198 P. 814, 1921 (Cal. App. 1921); see also CAL. PENAL CODE §
1473 (2011).
100. Arata, 198 P. at 814.
101. See Samantha Graf& Marice Ashe, Revised Memorandum on Procedural Due Process Requirements
for Recipients of TB-Control-Related Home Isolation and Work Exclusion Order, PUBLIC HEALTH LAW
INSTITUTE, http://www.ctca.org/legal/Memorandum-onProceduralDueProcessRev%/209-05.pdf, at
Fn.23 (last visited December 3, 2011).
102. See FLA. STAT. § 384.281 (2011).
103. Id




chapter does not limit a person's right to obtain a writ of habeas corpus."o0
These divergent laws on habeas show a lack of a coherent body of
law dealing with habeas writs in quarantine and isolation detention.
However, despite the divergences of state quarantine and isolation laws
and the procedures for filing petitions for writ of habeas corpus, the one
common theme among states is that overwhelming majority of such
habeas writs are denied citing either broad police powers or deference to
the determinations of health officers.
A. Cases Denying The Writ
Public health practitioners can claim many successes in courtrooms
when it comes to non-criminal habeas corpus as it relates to quarantine and
isolation detainees. Since the 1900s, high courts in several states have
upheld these detentions, denying the writs on the grounds that private
rights are subordinate to the general interest of the public.' For example,
in State ex rel. McBride v. Superior Court for King County,'o the court
held that determination by the Board of Health that a quarantine detainee
was afflicted with a contagious disease was final, conclusive, and not
subject to judicial review.'09 The case required a construction of the
quarantine regulations of the city of Seattle and the state law creating a
state board of health and defining its powers and duties."0 The detainee
petitioned for writ of habeas corpus, alleging that he was committed to the
isolation unit in a hospital because the Health Commissioner found him to
be afflicted with a dangerous, infectious, and contagious disease."' The
detainee challenged the power of the health officer to detain him. In
finding for the Commissioner, the court held that it was within the police
power of the legislature, in dealing with the problems of public health, to
make the determination of a fact by a properly constituted health officer
final and binding upon the public as well as upon the courts." 2
This absolute deference to public health authorities is also seen in
106. TEX. HEALTH & SAF. CODE § 81.201 (2011).
107. State ex rel. McBride v. Superior Court for King County, 103 Wash. 409, 413 (1918) ("Private rights
must be deemed to be subordinate to the general interest of the public. And in respect of personal rights
every citizen is bound to conform his conduct and the pursuit of his calling to such general rules as are
adopted by society, from time to time, for the common welfare.").
108. Id
109. Id. at 420.
110. Id at 409
111. Id
112. Id at 420.
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People ex rel. Barmore v. Robertson,1 13 Ex parte Company,'1 4 Varholy v.
Sweat,"5 Moore v. Draper,"' and In re Halko."7
In Barmore,"' petitioner sought a writ of habeas corpus contending
that the health department unlawfully restrained her liberty by ordering her
quarantined and confined to her home. She was placed under quarantine
after tests showed she was a typhoid carrier. In upholding the quarantine
order and denying the writ, the court reasoned that:
"Generally speaking, what laws or regulations are necessary to
protect public health and secure public comfort is a legislative
question, and appropriate measures intended and calculated to
accomplishthese ends are not subject to judicial review. The
exercise of the police power is a matter resting in the discretion
of the legislature or the board or tribunal to which the power is
delegated, and the courts will not interfere with the exercise of
this power except where the regulations adopted for the
protection of the public health are arbitrary, oppressive and
unreasonable. The court has nothing to do with the wisdom or
expediency of the measures adopted."ll9
Similarly, in Ex parte Company,'20 petitioners filed applications for
writs of habeas corpus seeking to be released from quarantine which was
imposed by the health commissioner. The women were charged with
unlawfully occupying a building for the purpose of prostitution, lewdness,
and assignation. 2 ' They were placed on quarantine because they had been
found to have venereal diseases. In upholding the power of the
Commissioner to quarantine the petitioners, the Ohio Supreme Court held
that the Commissioner properly exercised his power to quarantine the
detainees because the protection of the health and lives of the public was
paramount. It noted "that the legislature in the exercise of its constitutional
authority may lawfully confer on boards of health the power to enact
sanitary ordinances having the force of law within the districts over which
113. 302 Ill. 422 (1922).
114. 139 N.E. 204 (Ohio 1922).
115. 15 So. 2d 267 (Fla. 1943).
116. 57 So. 2d 648 (Fla. 1952).
117. 246 Cal. App. 2d. 553, 556 (1966) (noting that health regulations enacted by the state under its police
power and providing even drastic measures for the elimination of disease, whether in human beings, crops
or cattle, in a general way are not affected by constitutional provisions, either of the state or national
government).
118. 302 Ill. at 422.
119. Id. at 817.




their jurisdiction extends, is not an open question." 2 2 Again here, we see
the great deference to the executive.
In Varholy, petitioner sought review of the order from the circuit
court, which denied her petition for writ of habeas corpus to secure her
release from the county jail. She alleged that she was charged with the
offense of being drunk and disorderly. The county sheriff however stated
that he was holding her by virtue of a commitment and order of quarantine
by the health officer.123 The health officer testified that petitioner had
voluntarily submitted to an examination and that the laboratory reports
showed that the she was infected with a venereal disease, though there was
a negative report as to the presence of syphilis.'24 The circuit court ordered
that petitioner remain under quarantine for treatment until she was cured of
the disease. In affirming the circuit court, the Supreme Court of Florida
noted that generally speaking, rules and regulations necessary to protect
the public health are legislative questions, and appropriate methods
intended and calculated to accomplish these ends will not be disturbed by
the courts.'25 But unlike the two previous cases, the Varholy court went on
to state that the constitutional guarantees of personal liberty and private
property cannot be unreasonably and arbitrarily invaded. The courts have
the right to inquire into any alleged unconstitutional exercise or abuse of
the policepowers of the legislature, or of the health authorities in the
enactment of statutes or regulations, or the abuse or misuse by the boards
of health or their officers and agents of such authority as may be lawfully
vested in them by such statutes or regulations.'26
Almost a decade later, the Florida Supreme Court was faced with a
similar case in Moore.127 In that case, petitioner, who had tuberculosis, was
confined in a state sanitarium pursuant to a commitment issued by the
county judge.'28 Petitioner filed a writ of habeas corpus, claiming that his
confinement was unlawful and denied him due process because the statute
under which he was committed was unconstitutional. The Supreme Court
affirmed the lower court, essentially restating the Illinois Supreme Court's
holding in Barmore,'29 to wit:
122. Id. at 206.
123. Varholy, 15 So. 2d at 268.
124. Id.
125. id. at 269
126. Id.
127. 57 So. 2d 648 (Fla. 1952).
128. Id.
129. 302 Ill. at 422.
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[W]hat laws or regulations are necessary to protect public health
and secure public comfort is a legislative question, and
appropriate measures intended and calculated to accomplish
these ends are not subject to judicial review. The exercise of the
police power is a matter resting in the discretion of the
Legislature or the board or tribunal to which the power is
delegated, and the courts will not interfere with the exercise of
this power except where the regulations adopted for the
protection of the public health are arbitrary, oppressive and
unreasonable. The court has nothing to do with the wisdom or
expediency of the measures adopted.'
The line of historical cases dealing with habeas corpus in quarantine
and isolation are identical in their steadfast refusal to overturn quarantine
orders."' It is acknowledged here that the standard developed by the
Florida and Illinois Supreme Courts (i.e., the standard for reviewing the
constitutionality of state regulations permitting public health detentions),
has reasonable policy justification for the protection of the public's health.
However, what stands out most from the other historical cases is that most
of these courts grant agencies wide discretion and seemingly place
quarantine orders out of judicial review. This then implicates a second
standard of reviewing administrative decisions made by health officials.
Regarding the ability of courts to review agency decisions, Professor
Richards has noted that:
A key issue in administrative law is the relationship between
courts and agencies. If courts review all agency decisions de
novo, rehearing expert witnesses and substituting their decisions
for those of the agencies, the government loses the value of
agency expertise and flexibility. However, if courts do not
reviewv agency actions, this inaction will undermine the
separation of powers. This is a core issue in administrative law,
with the Supreme Court limiting judicial efforts to impose
additional requirements on agency decision-making, upholding
significant deference to agencies for some actions, but
establishing rules for when such deference is limited.'32
130. 57 So. 2d at 649.
131. Paula Mindes, Tuberculosis Quarantine: A Review of Legal Issues in Ohio and Other States. 10 J.L.
& HEALTH 403, 423 (1995).
132. Edward Richards, Public Health Law as Administrative Law: Example Lessons, 10 J. HEALTH CARE
L. & POL'Y 61, 68-69 (2007).
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But agency deference has its limits.' 3 Agency deference prevents
opponents of public actions from being able to contest the decisions.13
One of the crucial benefits of habeas review in non-criminal contexts is
that habeas is often the only means by which the executive branch can be
induced to disclose information it may possess regarding detention, and to
justify publicly the detention. 3 s This important function is frequently
overlooked in the context of post-conviction review of criminal sentences,
because an adequate trial procedure will have revealed the asserted factual
and legal basis of the petitioner's detention. Where there has been no trial,
however, habeas corpus may be the only way that the petitioner, and the
public at large, will learn of the asserted basis for detention.'36
Another problem with the cases denying the writ is that they
primarily date from the early part of the 20th century, with limited
examples after the 1920s. If one assumes that in those days, epidemics
were widespread, and disease testing and treatment procedures were not as
developed as today, then it would be logical for courts to give deference to
the decisions of the health officers in sacrificing individuals rights for the
greater good. As professor Edward Richards notes,
The drafters of the Constitution lived in an age when death from
communicable disease was the norm, when almost every family
had lost a child to illness, and when the fundamental security of
the nation was frequently under threat from external enemies
and conflicts with native peoples. The threat of disease was not
just to the individual, but to the state itself . . .. The severity of
these threats was in the minds of the judges who would review
governmental actions against dangerous persons and conditions,
the legislators who passed the acts enabling these actions, and
the citizens whose support the government needed to function.
Individuals might resist, but there was a societal consensus that
the protection of society was more important than the rights of
the individual.137
133. See, e.g., Ken Zhen Zhao v. United States Dep't of.Justice, 265 F.3d 83, 86 (2nd Cir. 2001) ("Courts
ordinarily defer to such discretionary administrative determinations, lest a court substitute a judicial view
for an agency's experience and expertise. But granting deference to administrative tribunals does not mean
we have clothed their rulings with that kind of power expressed in the maxim the 'king can do no
wrong. "').
134. Richards, supra note 132 at 69.
135. Jon Connolly & Marc D. Falkoff, Habeas Corpus as Information-Forcing Device, SSRN, Aug. 13,
2007, at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract id=1007090 (last visited Sept. 1, 2011).
136. Id.
137. Richards, supra note 87, at 31.
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But almost a hundred years later, "neither medicine nor
constitutional law is the same."'38 Although the policy considerations
remain the same, it is simply not true that we must always sacrifice
individual rights and liberty to take effective public health action against
contagious diseases.13 Indeed this point was the driving force among the
courts granting the writ.
B. Cases Granting the Writ
The grounds upon which habeas corpus has been awarded to
individuals seeking relief from quarantine or isolation detention fall
largely into one of two camps: violations of procedural due process,'4 0 and
requirements for an evidentiary basis justifying detention.
Beginning with the procedural defects that can give rise to a
favorable habeas ruling, Greene v. Edwards,'4 ' awarded habeas corpus
relief to a tuberculosis patient involuntarily confined to a hospital. In that
case, a petition alleging that Mr. Greene was suffering from active
communicable tuberculosis was filed with the circuit court under the West
Virginia Tuberculosis Control Act.'42 After receiving the petition, the court
fixed a hearing date and had the papers served upon Mr. Greene. The
papers served did not notify Mr. Greene that he was entitled to be
represented by counsel at the hearing. He was not appointed counsel until
after the commencement of his hospitalization commitment hearing,
leaving counsel no time to prepare for his defense.'43 Mr. Greene
challenged his commitment arguing among others that the Tuberculosis
Control Act did not afford him procedural due process because: "(1) it
fail[ed] to guarantee the alleged tubercular a right to counsel; (2) it fail[ed]
to insure that he may cross-examine, confront and present witnesses; and
(3) it fail[ed] to require that he be committed only upon clear, cogent and
convincing proof."' 44 The court agreed, reasoning that the Tuberculosis
Control Act provided authority for this type of commitment but lacked
adequate procedural safeguards by both comparing the statute to the
138. Annas, supra note 20, at 55.
139. Id. at 34.
140. See, e.g., In re Mossie Jarrel, 28 Ohio N.P. 473 (1930) (Defendant was arrested by Cincinnati city
police and put in the city's workhouse, where she was examined by a doctor who reported that she had a
venereal disease. She was then quarantined and filed a habeas corpus petition for release. The court granted
it because the proper procedures had not been followed in confining her.); see also Mindes, supra note 131,
at 423.
141. 263 S.E.2d 661 (W. Va. 1980).
142. Id. at 663.
143. Id.
144. Id. at 662.
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safeguards provided for in the commitment of mentally ill patients and
likening the timely appointment of counsel to criminal procedural
requirements. The court concluded that persons charged under the act
"must be afforded: (1) an adequate written notice detailing the grounds and
underlying facts on which commitment is sought; (2) the right to counsel
and, if indigent, the right to appointed counsel; (3) the right to be present,
to cross-examine, to confront and to present witnesses; (4) the standard of
proof .. . to be by clear, cogent and convincing evidence; and (5) the right
to a verbatim transcript of the proceedings for purposes of appeal." 4 5
This case sought to strike a balance between the individual's right
and the public health good. Above all, it focused procedural due process
rights in quarantine and isolation cases.
Ex parte Hardcastle decided in Texas in 1919 touched on another
procedural consideration determining that the decision of a health officer
to arrest a person suspected of being infected with gonorrhea is final for
the purposes of judicial review.'46 In that case, the relator was held under
an order of the city health officer, by virtue of quarantine regulations
established in accord with an act of the legislature, on the basis that she
was affected with gonorrhea. The issue was whether or not the decision of
the health officer was final or whether it could be challenged by writ of
habeas corpus.'4 7 The court stated that "We conclude that under the Act of
the Legislature in question the relator had the right to a hearing on writ of
habeas corpus, and therein to prove the non-existence of the facts
necessary to authorize her continued detention and thereby obtain
release." 48 Here the court granted habeas and referred the petitioner to a
hearing for determination of whether facts existed to justify the quarantine
restraint.
The second overarching category of circumstances under which
quarantined persons have successfully obtained habeas relief is where the
state failed to carry its burden of demonstrating that detention for the
control of infectious disease is supported by evidence such that it is not
arbitrary or oppressive. A set of companion cases, Caves v. Hilbert,1"' and
Hill v. Hilbert' decided in Oklahoma in 1950, granted habeas to male and
female business partners detained in the quarantine or venereal health
145. Id. at 663.
146. 208 S.W. 531, 531-32 (Tex. Crim. App. 1919).
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. 222 P.2d 169 (Okla. Crim. App. 1950).
150. 222 P.2d 166 (Okla. Crim. App. 1950).
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clinic section of the city jail following their arrest for "occupying a [hotel]
room for immoral purposes.""' The evidence showed that the petitioner
(Hill) and Mrs. Caves were having an affair, that after their arrest, each
had been given the first test for venereal disease and that results of the test
were negative. However, under the rules of the clinic, persons held for
examination were required to remain in quarantine for 48 hours so that a
further examination could be made. "This second examination was
required on the theory that the person held might have been exposed to a
venereal disease just prior to the arrest, which might not be detectable until
after forty-eight hours had passed."'52 The court disagreed. Since there was
no evidence that the woman was a prostitute or that she and her business
partner had used the hotel room for sexual relations, the court determined
that there were insufficient facts to justify the pair's restraint pending
venereal disease test results. The court concluded that such detention was
"arbitrary and oppressive" and arbitrarily exercised merely to impose
additional punishment. '"
In that same vein, the court in Ex parte Dillon, a California case from
1919, released a man and woman charged with violation of an ordinance
prohibiting extra-marital relations because there were insufficient facts to
show they had committed a misdemeanor, thereby making this detention a
"pretended quarantine" without "reasonable cause."'54 The court went
further to state that even if the arrest were proper, extended detention for
venereal disease testing was not warranted because there is no adequate,
rational correlation between those arrested for violating the ordinance and
people actually at risk for venereal disease. The state must make some
further showing that a given person is likely to be infected."
The court in a 1921 case, Ex parte Roman granted habeas for a girl
detained in a correctional school on the suspicion that she had venereal
151. Id. at 168.
152. Id. at 168.
153. Id. at 174.
154. 186 P. 170, 171 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1919).
155. Id. at 172 ("The question that we finally reach here is as to whether the health department may
reasonably assume, without any previous knowledge, information, or report as to the individual concerned,
that every person arrested by officers and booked at the city jail as having violated the 'Rooming-house
Ordinance' is reasonably likely to be afflicted with a quarantinable venereal disease. If it could be assumed
that every person who had sexual intercourse with another to whom he or she was not married, at a hotel or
lodging-house at which they might meet for the purpose, was a person given to promiscuous acts of sexual
intercourse, then we might agree that, in part, the practice of the chief of police and health department in
such cases as has been herein outlined finds some justification in the law. But we do not agree that any such
general deduction should be made, in view of the great concern of the law for the liberty of individuals. We
think that for such detention to be legally justified, the return of the officer should show some further
reason why the persons so detained are suspected of being afflicted with disease.").
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disease after the completion of her sentence.'56 Although this particular
case was moot given that Roman was already released following negative
test results, the court espoused the same sentiment that facts must exist to
justify restraint. 157
These cases, though few, recognize the gravity of civil commitment
particularly in quarantine and isolation. They also establish that in some
instances, "health authorities do not always exercise their discretion in
value neutral, scientific ways."' 8 Consequently, the need for due process
protections, particularly procedural due process rights, is paramount. As
the West Virginia Supreme Court remarked:
[W]e examined the procedural safeguards which must be
extended to persons charged under our statute governing the
involuntary hospitalization of the mentally ill. We noted that
Article 3, Section 10 of the West Virginia Constitution and the
Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution provide that
no person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without
due process of law; we stated: "This Court recognized in the
case of Schutte v. Schutte, 86 W.Va. 701, 104 S.E. 108 (1920)
that, 'liberty, full and complete liberty, is a right of the very
highest nature. It stands next in order to life itself. The
Constitution guarantees and safeguards it. An adjudication of
insanity is a partial deprivation of it."'l
59
"Given the obvious liberty interests implicated when individuals are
involuntarily confined, sufficient due process in quarantine regulations is
imperative."" Confinement for both public health and mental health is
based upon the principle that restriction of individual rights is justified by
the avoidance of future harm to the wider community."' However, "courts
now constitutionally require precise criteria for civil commitment based
upon dangerousness, and strict due process procedural safeguards."' 62 It is
these due process protections that the paper now turns to.
156. 199 P. 580 (Okla. Crim. App. 1921).
157. Id. at 581.
158. LAWRENCE GoSTIN, PUBLIC HEALTH LAW. POWER, DUTY, RESTRAINT, 216 (Univ. of Ca. Press,
2000).
159. Greene v. Edwards, 263 S.E.2d 661, 662-63.
160. Daubert, supra note 19, at 1300.
161. Larry Gostin, The Future of Communicable Disease Control: Toward a New Concept in Public
Health Law, 83 THE MILBANK QUARTERLY 1, 3 (2005).
162. Id.
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VI. PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS IN QUARANTINE AND
ISOLATION
Freedom from physical restraint has always been at the core of the
liberty protected by the due process clause from arbitrary governmental
action.' Chief Justice Burger writing for the majority in Addington v.
Texas noted that the "Court repeatedly has recognized that civil
commitment for any purpose constitutes a significant deprivation of liberty
that requires due process protection."'" This principle was further
reiterated in Foucha v. Lousiana when the majority stated that "the loss of
liberty produced by an involuntary commitment is more than a loss of
freedom from confinement. Due process requires that the nature of
commitment bear some reasonable relation to the purpose for which the
individual is committed."165
However, "an individual's constitutionally protected interest in
avoiding physical restraint may be overridden even in the civil context." "
In Foucha, Justice Thomas writing for the majority observed that "[w]e
have also held that in certain narrow circumstances persons who pose a
danger to others or to the community may be subject to limited
confinement." 161
But how narrow are these circumstances? One such circumstance
would seem to be when an individual is "a dangerous patient."' 68 Public
health authorities possess a variety of authorities to restrict the autonomy
or liberty of persons who pose a danger to the public.169 These may include
selecting and implementing relevant interventions, such as contact and
partner tracing, post exposure prophylaxis, and separation of infected and
unexposed susceptibles through the use of isolation, cohorting or
163. Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 356; see also Addington, 441 U.S. at 418.
164. Addington, 441 U.S. at 425.
165. Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 79 (1992).
166. Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 356.
167. Foucha, 504 U.S. at 80.
168. See O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 576 (1975) (where the Supreme Court held that "a State
cannot constitutionally confine without more, a non-dangerous individual who is capable of surviving
safely in freedom by himself or with the help of willing and responsible family members or friends"); see
also Richard Goodman, The "Dangerous" Infected Patient: An Approach to Characterizing The Risks
Posed by Persons With Communicable Infectious Diseases, 30 J. LEGAL MED. 13, 14 (2009) (writing that
"from a medical and public health perspective, not all persons who are infected with communicable
pathogens represent identical risks and threats to others, thus prompting consideration of alternatives to the
term 'dangerous patient' that may be better suited for exploring the risk implications of persons who are
infected with serious communicable pathogens. For this reason, I begin by suggesting use of an alternative
term-the 'potentially dangerous infected person'-in place of the dangerous patient.").




In one of the most arbitrary uses of the dangerous patient exception,
the Ohio Supreme Court upheld a quarantine regulation that "all known
prostitutes and people associated with them shall be considered as
reasonably suspected of having a venereal disease.""' This is an example
of an arbitrary decision, i.e., imposing quarantine based on unfounded
assumptions.
In another arbitrary detention case, in May 2007 the American Civil
Liberties Union (ACLU) of Arizona filed a lawsuit on behalf of Robert
Daniels, a tuberculosis patient who had been held in the jail ward at the
Maricopa Medical Center for nine months.172 Daniels was involuntarily
committed after Maricopa County Public Health Department officials
claimed he was a serious public health risk for not wearing a mask while
visiting a local convenience store.'7 ' The ACLU argued in its lawsuit that
the county was violating Daniels' Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment rights
to due process and equal treatment and had substantially deprived him of
his fundamental rights to liberty, travel and privacy. 174 Commenting on
the same case, Professor Wendy Parmet writes:
[t]he story of Robert Daniels may, in fact, be a more typical tale
of what happens when an individual is viewed as dangerous on
account of being infected. Daniels was a 27-year-old Russian
immigrant living in Arizona when he was diagnosed
(incorrectly) with XDR-TB. In July of 2006, he was
involuntarily quarantined in Phoenix, Arizona for disobeying a
court order requiring him to wear a face mask in public at all
times. He was then turned over to the Maricopa County Sheriff,
who kept Daniels in solitary confinement in the county jail for
nearly a year without access to showers, reading material, or
even a view of the outdoors. Eventually, after the American
Civil Liberties Union took the case, Daniels was sent to the
National Jewish Medical Center for treatment, where. . .
physicians determined that he did not in fact have XDR-TB. But
even after he was released, Daniels was treated like a criminal;
170. Goodman, supra note 168, at 18 (2009).
171. Gostin, supra note 158, at 212 citing Exparte Company, 139 N.E. 204, 205 (Ohio 1922)).
172. ACLU OF ARIZONA SUES COUNTY OFFICIALS OVER INHUMANE CONFINEMENT OF TB PATIENT, Press
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once he returned to Phoenix, the Sheriff threatened him with
prosecution for his pre-quarantine behavior. Perhaps not
surprisingly, Daniels fled the Sheriffs jurisdiction, returning to
Russia.1 5
Daniels' case is an example of the panic of the majority."'
Historically, government agents have used health scares as a form of moral
panic."' Courts must, therefore, guard against the risk that governmental
action may be grounded in popular myths, irrational fears, or noxious
fallacies rather than well-founded science."' Indeed this is what makes
habeas challenge necessary in public health detentions.
VII. THE NEED FOR HABEAS CORPUS RELIEF FOR
QUARANTINE AND ISOLATION DETAINEES IN ALL THE
STATES
State health laws "permit the detention of people in the absence of
criminal charges, and even, in certain instances, following the completion
of sentence.""'9 For example, state and federal statutes provide broad
175. Parmet, supra note 64, at 87- 88.
176. See Bruce Jennings, On Authority and Justification in Public Health, 55 FLA. L. REV. 1241, 1255-56
(2003) ("People gripped by fear of imminent danger, panic, hatred, and revenge will not be capable of
reasoning or the practice of justification under the deliberative model. At such times, even the viability of
the judicial model is threatened, and people tend to turn to charismatic leaders who assert rather than argue,
provoke rather than persuade. Both liberals and communitarians should be exceedingly nervous at this
prospect. At such times political theory can do little but hope that the citizenry returns to its senses quickly
and that countervailing checks and balances within the government will prevent the worst abuses of
power.").
177. See generally Ed Jackson & Charles Pou, The University of Georgia, Georgia Info, This Day in
Georgia History, http://georgiainfo.galileo.usg.edu/tdgh-aug/augl8.htm (last visited Sept. 1, 2011) (In
1908, in response to a national panic in 1907 over typhoid fever outbreaks attributed to "Typhoid Mary,"
the Georgia General Assembly adopted a joint resolution urging Congress to create a U.S. Health
Department. The memorial listed a host of reasons why the federal government should act, including the
financial cost of treatment and the loss of life from tuberculosis, typhoid fever, and other communicable
diseases. It further noted that "disease and degeneracy are strong factors in the causation of crime"; that
national action was needed since only 23 states then maintained vital statistics; and that, "[i]t is more
humane and noble to destroy the enemies of health when they touch our territories rather than allow the
conditions that are inviting them in and then undertake to fight them when they are bush whacking us from
every side of the road as we travel from section to section and from State to State, watching an opportunity
when they might leap from the walls of a house or couch at night or streams as they trickle through the
forest or food as we feed out bodies."); see also Robert Weidner, Methamphetamine in Three Small
Midwestern Cities: Evidence of a Moral Panic, J. PSYCHOACTIVE DRUGS, (Sept 2009), at
http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_6831/is_3_41/ai-n56119760/?tag--mantle-skin;content , (last visited
Sept. 1, 2011) ("For more than a century in the United States, 'social problems have often been blamed on
the devastating effects of some harmful substance or chemical, and at various times, different substances
have been seen as the major demon figures threatening the nation.' . . . Drug scares and moral panics are
harmful in that they make subjective mountains out of objective molehills.").
178. City of Newark v. J.S., 652 A.2d 265, 273-74 (N.J. Sup. Ct. Law Div. 1993).
179. Klein & Wittes, supra note 33, at 152.
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authority to quarantine people who have communicable diseases.'s But
when decisions to quarantine and isolate are arbitrary and capricious as
shown by the historic cases discussed in part VI and the case of Robert
Daniels, is there a need for habeas relief? The answer is an obvious yes,
but this does not necessarily inspire palpable confidence that states will not
make these kinds of arbitrary decisions, unless of course, revisions are
made to their public health statutes. This is particularly true for states with
old, unrevised statutes that provide no due process protections for
quarantine and isolation detainees.'"' One public health attorney has noted
that "many of the states have old, broadly worded statutes that may need
revision. There is a difference of opinion as to whether these broadly
worded laws should be revised or not to include more procedure to follow
in imposing quarantine and otherwise reflect modern developments in law.
9'182
The need for the states to revise their statutes is certainly imperative
in light of modern day emerging diseases like Severe Acute Respiratory
Syndrome (SARS) and influenza, A(HIN1) virus. These diseases are
capable of striking and spreading fast, therefore, resulting in mass amounts
of preventive detentions, some of which may be unnecessary.' Due
process protections would therefore be paramount. However, critics of
including due process protections (particularly criminal law due process
standards) in quarantine and isolation orders contend that it "increases the
cost of carrying out public health measures, reducing their effectiveness
and endangering the public."' 84 But this argument is countervailed by the
180. Id. at 87.
181. See, e.g., J.S., 652 A.2d at 270 (The court, when commenting on New Jersey's statutory scheme for
dealing with TB which dates from 1912 with only minor amendments made since 1917, stated: "This law
allows [the court] to enter an order committing a person to a hospital if he or she is 'suffering from' TB and
'is an actual menace to the community.' Notice of the hearing is required and was provided. Neither the
statute nor the implementing regulation, N.J.A.C. 8:57-1.10, provides any guidance on the procedures to
follow when such applications are made, nor what standards are to be used in issuing such orders. There is
no case law in New Jersey providing guidance on these and many other related issues." The court went on
to state: "The regulatory schemes in other jurisdictions vary widely... [t]here are older schemes like that in
New Jersey which provide little or no guidance. There are those that provide detailed procedural details to
guarantee due process while still allowing detention, isolation, quarantine, or confinement in the most
extreme cases."). Id.
182. See Hargan, supra note 69.
183. See Annas, supra note 20, at 65 (noting that "mass involuntary quarantine is generally unnecessary
and almost always ineffective because it leads to mistrust of the government.").
184. Richards, supra note 87, at 28; see also Morales v. Turman, 562 F.2d 994, 997-98 (5th Cir. 1977)
(discussing the right to treatment doctrine, and noting that "[w]henever the state detains a person not in
retribution for a specific offense, for an unlimited period of time or without the full procedural safeguards
of a criminal trial, proponents of this right claim that due process requires that the person deprived of his
liberty be in return entitled to treatment." But this argument is questionable, noted the court because "[t]he
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fact that since the 1960s the Supreme Court has stated that persons subject
to civil detention are entitled to some procedural due process.'15  As the
Supreme Court noted in Addington, "civil commitment for any purpose
constitutes a significant deprivation of liberty that requires due process
protection."'" Furthermore, some state courts have also held that persons
with infectious diseases are entitled to procedural due process
protections.' Second, some have argued that the power of quarantine and
isolation does not see much use today.' The use of widespread
quarantines has declined in the 20th Century, as improved sanitation,
vaccination, and modernized public health practice have reduced the
incidence and lethality of contagious diseases in the United States.' The
argument that procedural due protections would be a burden to public
health is therefore unpersuasive. The need for habeas challenge is still
critical, because "the law of quarantine still represents a reservoir of power
on which public health officers [can still] draw when necessary."l9
As stated earlier, habeas is also important in public health because it
is often the only way where the decision of the expert can be questioned.
The only caveat here is that habeas is normally a collateral challenge to a
conviction. Because of the nature of public health detentions where
judicial review is done after the detention, the challenge would work best
if it is a direct challenge. This is not uncommon since in the federal
system, pre-conviction habeas corpus actions may be filed in federal court
under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 when a defendant wishes to challenge a state's
right to proceed on criminal charges as a violation of the Double Jeopardy
interests of the individual and of society in the particular situation determine the standards for due process. .
. . A state should not be required to provide the procedural safeguards of a criminal trial when imposing a
quarantine to protect the public against a highly communicable disease.").
185. Gostin, supra note 158 at 215.
186. Addington, 441 U.S. at 425.
187. See, e.g., Greene, 263 S.E. 2d at (noting that "specifically, persons charged under the act (The
Tuberculosis Control Act) must be afforded: (1) an adequate written notice detailing the grounds and
underlying facts on which commitment is sought; (2) the right to counsel and, if indigent, the right to
appointed counsel; (3) the right to be present, to cross-examine, to confront and to present witnesses; (4) the
standard of proof to be by clear, cogent and convincing evidence; and (5) the right to a verbatim transcript
of the proceedings for purposes of appeal); Hill v. Hilbert, 222 P.2d 166, 168 (Okla. Crim. App. 1950),
(noting that "where a person so restrained of his or her liberty questions the power of the health authorities
to impose such restraint, the burden is immediately upon the latter to justify by showing facts in support of
the order"); J. S., 652 A.2d at 276 ("[T]he constitutional concept of due process is designed to prevent
irrational discrimination by ensuring a forum that can hear opposing perspectives and by insisting that
distinctions are rationally based. The decisive consideration where personal liberty is involved is that each
individual's fate must be adjudged on the facts of his own case, not on the general characteristics of a
'class' to which he may be assigned.").
188. Klein & Wittes, supra note 33, at 170.





Pre-detention habeas challenge can, however, be problematic in
public health emergency situations. Quarantine and isolation would
provide time for the health authorities to address the pandemic, i.e. time to
test the individuals for pathogens, conduct contact tracing, conduct
surveillance, start prophylactic treatment and even time to buy and
distribute vaccines. One would be hard pressed to argue that habeas
challenge should be provided to individuals prior to isolation and or
quarantine. But this paper does not argue against states' power of
quarantine and isolation.'92 It only calls for inclusion of procedural due
process protections at the front end, and allowing habeas corpus challenges
during the commitment to ensure that decisions of health officers are not
arbitrary and capricious. In essence, what the paper is saying is that "you
can isolate me from society if you think i pose serious medical risk to
others, but prove to me that i truly deserve to be isolated and or
quarantined and that there is no other way."
VIII. SUGGESTED APPROACHES
In a habeas challenge, the questions to be raised would include facial
challenge to the validity of the statute,'93 whether the disease itself is
sufficiently important or infectious to warrant detention, who is making
the decision for quarantine and isolation, for example, an health officer
versus law enforcement officer, the expertise of the decision maker and
whether his or her expertise is being used to advance the panic of the
majority. The question then arises, how can this be done without
compromising the ability of public health officials to assure the health of
the population? Put another way, how can this be done without violating
public policy?
First, public health decisions to quarantine and isolate should not be
191. Brent E. Newton, A Primer On Post-Conviction Habeas Corpus Review, NAT'L ASSOC. OF CRIM.
DEFENSE LAWYERS CHAMPION MAG., June 2005, 16, at http://www.nacdl.org/Champion.aspx?id=4542
(last visited Sept. 5, 2011).
192. For an in-depth discussion of the pros and cons of the states' use of public health powers, see Gostin,
supra note 66; Wendy E. Parmet, Liberalism, Communitarianism, and Public Health: Comments on
Lawrence 0. Gostin's Lecture, 55 FLA. L. REv.1221 (2003); Jennings, supra note 176; George J. Annas,
Puppy Love Bioterrorism, Civil Rights, and Public Health, 55 FLA. L. REv. 1171 (2003); James F. Childress
& Ruth Gaare Bernheim, Beyond the Liberal and Communitarian Impasse: A Framework and Vision for
Public Health, 55 F FLA. L. REv.1191 (2003).
193. Swendiman & Elsea, supra note 14 (noting that, "although the primary function of a writ of habeas
corpus is to test the legality of the detention, petitioners often seek a declaration that the statute under
which they were quarantined is unconstitutional or violative of due process").
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tailored to the agency's point of view more than the petitioner/ detainee's
side. Quarantine orders should be issued by an independent judicial
authority and only upon clear and convincing evidence from a qualified
health professional that the individual possesses an immediate and
substantial risk to the community. 194 This will ensure trust between the
public and the public health establishment.'9 5 Second, courts should defer
to the decisions of the public health experts only to the extent that their
decisions are relevant. The process requires reason, not authority. As a
threshold matter, public health experts and legislatures "need to determine
which individuals and bodies at local, state and federal levels can declare
public health emergencies, under what conditions, and what these
declarations mean for public health, officials, funding and authority.'96
Additionally, "public health officers need to acquire explicit working and
knowledge of the jurisdiction's laws regarding isolation and quarantine."'
Third, only highly contagious diseases should warrant quarantine and
isolation'98, and the confinement should not last longer than the usual
incubation period of the disease.'99 Fourth, judicial review must be more
frequent depending on the medical diagnosis.200 Finally, those quarantined
194. Gregory P. Campbell, The Global HJNJ Pandemic, Quarantine Law, and the Due Process Conflict,
12 SAN DIEGO INT'L L.J. 497, 531 (2011).
195. Sutton, supra note 90, at 153 (noting that "public health personnel . . . are concerned about the ethical
responsibility of trust between patient and healthcare giver.").
196. Kenneth De Ville, Legal Preparation and Pandemic Influenza, 13 J. PUB. HEALTH. MGMT. PRACTICE
314 (2007).
197. Id. at 315.
198. For example, Executive Order 13295, dated April 4, 2003 and titled "Revised List of Quarantinable
Communicable Diseases," lists Cholera as a quarantinable disease. The World Health Organization,
referring to Cholera treatment, however notes: "Cholera is an easily treatable disease. The prompt
administration of oral rehydration salts to replace lost fluids nearly always results in cure. In especially
severe cases, intravenous administration of fluids may be required to save the patient's life. Left untreated,
however, cholera can kill quickly following the onset of symptoms. This can happen at a speed that has
incited fear and paralyzed commerce throughout history. Although such reactions are no longer justified,
cholera continues to be perceived by many as a deadly and highly contagious threat that can spread through
international trade in food." See Health Topics, Treatment of Cholera, WHO,
http://www.who.int/topics/choleraltreatment/en/index.html (last visited Sept. 5, 2011).
199. Here, an analogy can be drawn from an immigration case, Zadvydas v. United States, 533 U.S. 678,
699-700 (2001). In discussing how long the United States Customs and Immigration Services (USCIS) can
detain an alien after an order of removal has been entered against him, the majority noted that "in
answering that basic question, the habeas court must ask whether the detention in question exceeds a period
reasonably necessary to secure removal . . . thus if removal is not reasonably foreseeable, the court should
hold continued detention unreasonable and no longer authorized by statute."
200. For example, Rules of the City of New York, 24 RCNY § 11.23 (f), on removal and detention of
cases, contacts and carriers who are or may be a danger to public health, provide in pertinent part: "When a
person or group is ordered to be detained for a period exceeding three (3) business days, and such person or
member of such group requests release, the Commissioner shall make an application for a court order
authorizing such detention within three (3) business days after such request by the end of the first business
day following such Saturday, Sunday, or legal holiday, which application shall include a request for an
expedited hearing. After any such request for release, detention shall not continue for more than five (5)
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or isolated should have a right to be represented by counsel if indigent20 '
a right to a hearing, and judicial review, just like in mental health cases. In
Vitek v. Jones20 2, for example, the Supreme Court held that transferring a
prisoner to a mental hospital implicated a liberty interest protected by the
Due Process Clause. Consequently, "the state was required to observe the
following minimum procedures. . .: A. [w]ritten notice to the prisoner that
a transfer to a mental hospital was being considered; B. [a] hearing. . . to
permit the prisoner to prepare, [and] at which disclosure to the prisoner is
made of the evidence being relied upon for the transfer. . .; C. [a]n
opportunity at the hearing to present testimony of witnesses by the defense
and to confront and cross-examine witnesses called by the state ... ; D. [a]n
independent decision maker; E. [a] written statement by the fact-finder as
to the evidence relied on and the reasons for transferring the inmate; F.
[a]vailability of legal counsel, furnished by the state, if the inmate is
financially unable to furnish his own; and G. [e]ffective and timely notice
of all the foregoing rights." 203
Because of the nature of infectious diseases, and the need for
quarantine and isolation to avoid clear and immediate dangers to others, it
is not likely that some of these procedural safeguards can be provided in
the context of quarantine and isolation. 20 For example, a patient suffering
business days in the absence of a court order authorizing detention. Notwithstanding the foregoing
provisions, in no event shall any person be detained for more than sixty (60) days without a court order
authorizing such detention. The Commissioner shall seek further court review of such detention within
ninety (90) days following the initial court order authorizing detention and thereafter within ninety (90)
days of each subsequent court review. In any court proceeding to enforce a Commissioner's order for the
removal or detention of a person or group issued pursuant to this subdivision or for review of the continued
detention of a person or group, the Commissioner shall prove the particularized circumstances constituting
the necessity for such detention by clear and convincing evidence."
201. For example, Minnesota statute on isolation and quarantine, M.S.A. § 144.4195 subdivision. 5(b)
(2011) provides in relevant part: "[Alny person subject to isolation or quarantine has the right to be
represented by counsel. Persons not otherwise represented may request the court to appoint counsel at the
expense of the Department of Health or of a local public health board that has entered into a written
delegation agreement with the commissioner under subdivision 7. The court shall appoint counsel when so
requested and may have one counsel represent a group of persons similarly situated. The appointments shall
be only for representation under subdivisions 3 and 4 and for appeals of orders under subdivisions 3 and 4.
On counsel's request, the commissioner or an agent of a local board of health authorized under section
145A.04 shall advise counsel of protective measures recommended to protect counsel from possible
transmission of the communicable disease. Appointments shall be made and counsel compensated
according to procedures developed by the Supreme Court."
202. 445 U.S. 480 (1980).
203. Id. at 494- 95 (1980).
204. See Daubert, supra note 19, at 1353 ("[PJublic health officials and courts should seriously consider
applying due process from a continuum framework: the greater the restraint and less definite the diagnosis,
the greater the due process protections. This continuum notion is consistent with both substantive and
procedural due process requirements. Such a framework will provide flexibility to public health officials
and courts while at the same time offering the greatest amount of safeguards possible to protect the valued
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from a highly contagious disease such as SARS or XDR TB cannot ask the
court to hold a hearing with the person present, prior to issuing an isolation
or quarantine order. 205 In emergency situations, there likely will not be
time to give such notice.206 Moreover, such a person cannot expect to
confront and cross-examine witnesses relied on by the state.20 However,
other remedies like habeas corpus challenge can be provided to the
individual, with little or no harm to society. This will be in consonance
with the cases that have found decisions of health officers to quarantine to
be arbitrary and capricious.
CONCLUSION
To contain the spread of a contagious illness, public health authorities
rely on many strategies. Two of these strategies are isolation and
quarantine.20 in the absence of rapid and definitive diagnostic tests,
vaccines, or cures, isolation and quarantine remains public health's best
strategy against the spread of mass illness.209 However, isolation and
quarantine interfere with liberty.2 10 Additionally, their effects on economic
interests are just as palpable.211 For example, those quarantined or isolated
would be unable to participate normally in daily life costing employers
productive workers and requiring people to fill in where necessary.2 12 It is
therefore necessary that quarantine and isolation be used sparingly, and
even more, adhere to the constitutional requirements of habeas corpus. The
advantages of including habeas corpus are manifold: habeas is often the
only means by which the executive branch can be induced to disclose
information it may possess regarding detention, and to justify publicly the
detention,213 it conforms with the Supreme Court's long line of cases that
teach that civil commitment for any purpose constitutes a significant
individual right to liberty.").
205. See Pub. Health Div., Office of the State Pub. Health Director, memo from Shannon O'Fallon, Senior
Asst. Atty Gen., OR Dept of Justice, to Hon. Laurie Monnes Anderson, Chair, Senate Health Care, Human
Serv's and Rural Health Pol'y Comm. HB 2111A, Modifies Isolation and Quarantine Law, (May 2,
201 1),(onfile with author). The link here is wrong and I am unable to find the correct link or document.
206. Id.
207. Id.
208. CDC Fact Sheet, supra note 31.
209. See Public Health, Seattle & King County, Isolation and Quarantine, Response Planning Toolkit,
ADVANCED PRACTICE CENTERS, http://www.apctoolkits.com/isolationandquarantine/ (last visited Sept. 6,
2011).
210. Gostin, supra note 66, at 1107.
211. Id.
212. Id.
213. Connolly & Falkoff, supra note 135.
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deprivation of liberty that requires due process protection,214 and above all,
it builds trust with the public. This trust is intended to encourage the
[petitioner/ detainee] to disclose otherwise sensitive information allowing
the health care giver to render treatment based upon full disclosure of the
person's medical condition. 215 This is an important cornerstone of public
health practice. Finally, habeas corpus ensures that decisions of health
officers are not arbitrary and capricious. In this sense, habeas corpus for
quarantine and isolation detainee cans serve the private right without
violating public policy.
214. Addington, 441 U.S. at 425.
215. Sutton, supra note 90, at 154.
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